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Abstract
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central
issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all
general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols
where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally. The complexity of manipulating
realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant was recently studied [4], but the
emphasis was on the question of whether or not a protocol becomes hard to manipulate for some constant
number of candidates. That work, in many cases, left open the question: How many candidates are
needed to make elections hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when comparing the relative
manipulability of different voting protocols. In this paper we answer that question for the voting
protocols of the earlier study: plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, regular cup, and randomized
cup. We also answer that question for two voting protocols for which no results on the complexity of
manipulation have been derived before: veto and plurality with runoff. It turns out that the voting
protocols under study become hard to manipulate at 3 candidates, 4 candidates, 7 candidates, or never.
∗Conitzer and Sandholm were funded by the National Science Foundation under CAREER Award IRI-9703122, Grant
IIS-9800994, ITR IIS-0081246, and ITR IIS-0121678.
†The second author thanks Helene Fargier, Michel Lemaitre and Gerard Verfaillie for stimulating discussions about
manipulation.
1 Introduction
Often, a group of agents has to make a common decision, yet they have different preferences about
which decision is made. Thus, it is of central importance to be able to aggregate the preferences, that
is, to make a socially desirable decision as to which candidate is chosen from a set of candidates. Such
candidates could be potential presidents, joint plans, allocations of goods or resources, etc. Voting is the
most general preference aggregation scheme, and has been used in several multiagent decision making
problems in computer science, such as collaborative filtering (e.g. [13]) and planning among multiple
automated agents (e.g. [6, 7]).
One key problem voting mechanisms are confronted with is that of manipulation by the voters. An
agent is said to vote strategically when it does not rank the alternatives according to its true preferences,
but rather so as to make the eventual outcome most favorable to itself. For example, if an agent prefers
Nader to Gore to Bush, but knows that Nader has too few other supporters to win, while Gore and
Bush are close to each other, the agent would be better off by declaring Gore as its top candidate.
Manipulation is an undesirable phenomenon because social choice schemes are tailored to aggregate
preferences in a socially desirable way, and if the agents reveal their preferences insincerely, a socially
undesirable candidate may be chosen.
The issue of strategic voting has been studied extensively. A seminal negative result, the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem, shows that if there are three or more candidates, then in any nondictatorial
voting scheme, there are preferences under which an agent is better off voting strategically [8, 14]. (A
voting scheme is called dictatorial if one of the voters dictates the social choice no matter how the
others vote.)
This problem has a strong impact on elections where voters are human. In automated group decision
making where the voters are software agents, the manipulability of protocols is even more problematic,
for at least three reasons. First, the algorithms they use to decide how to vote must be coded explicitly.
Given that the voting algorithm needs to be designed only once (by an expert), and can be copied to
large numbers of agents (even ones representing unsophisticated human voters), it is likely that rational
strategic voting will increasingly become an issue, unmuddied by irrationality, emotions, etc. Second,
software agents have more computational power and are more likely to find effective manipulations.
Third, the settings where software agents are used for voting are likely to be more anonymous, and
therefore the voters are likely to be less scrupulous. For example, they might not worry about the norm
that manipulation, in itself, is considered inapproriate (if the voter’s neighbor knows his preferences on
an issue and sees him vote differently, then the neighbor will consider him a liar). As another example,
anonymous voters are freed from the social pressures of voting in a particular way (e.g., voting for a
school rather than a cigar factory), so the space of viable votes—and thus viable manipulations—is
larger.
Nevertheless, there are several avenues for trying to avoid the possibility of manipulation. First,
social choice theorists and economists have studied settings where the voters’ preferences are restricted.
Under certain restrictions, such as single-peaked preferences or quasilinear preferences, nonmanipulable
protocols exist (e.g. [12, 6, 7]). The weakness of this approach is that in practice the protocol designer
cannot be sure that the agents’ preferences fall within the restriction. If they do not, it is impossible
to vote truthfully, so the protocol forces the agents to manipulate. A second approach to avoiding
manipulation is randomization. For example, a dictator could be chosen at random among the voters, in
which case there would be no incentive for manipulation. The randomization approach is undesirable if it
introduces too much noise into the election process, and it turns out that almost complete randomization
(as in the example above) is required in order to obtain a nonmanipulable protocol [9, 10]. Furthermore,
randomization can introduce manipulation possibilities even when none would have existed (for the
preferences that the agents happen to have) under a deterministic protocol [15].
We take a third tack toward avoiding manipulation: ensuring that finding a beneficial manipulation
is so hard computationally that it is unlikely that voters will be able to manipulate. So, unlike in most
of computer science, here high computational complexity is a desirable property. The harder it is to
manipulate, the better. Especially in the context of software agents, this computational complexity is
best measured with the usual tools from theoretical computer science. The approach of using computa-
tional complexity to avoid manipulation has not received much attention and many problems are still
open. Bartholdi et al. prove some hardness results under the assumption that not only the number
of voters but also the number of candidates is unbounded [2, 1]. Such results do not prove hardness
of manipulation in real elections where the number of candidates is small. Conitzer and Sandholm
addressed this issue by studying the complexity of manipulation when the number of candidates is a
constant [4]. The emphasis in that work was on the question of whether or not a protocol becomes hard
to manipulate for some constant number of candidates. This, in many cases, left open the question:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when
comparing the relative manipulability of different voting protocols.
In this paper we answer that question for the voting protocols of the earlier study: plurality, Borda,
STV, Copeland, maximin, regular cup, and randomized cup. We also answer that question for two
voting protocols for which no results on the complexity of manipulation have been derived before: veto
and plurality with runoff. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review standard
voting protocols. In Section 3 we present definitions of manipulation. The core of the paper is Section 4
where we present our results on the complexity of manipulation. Conclusions and future research are
discussed in Section 5.
2 Voting protocols
We now define the voting setting. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the finite set of voters. Let X = {1, . . . ,m}
be the finite set of candidates. The preferences of voter vi are given by a linear order Oi on X . A
preference profile is a vector P = 〈O1, . . . , On〉 of individual preferences.
A voting protocol is a function from the set of all preference profiles to the set of candidates X .1
The following list reviews the most common voting protocols. In the protocols that are based on scores,
the candidate with the highest score wins. In each of the listed protocols (even the ones that have
multiple rounds), the voters submit their preferences up front. That is, the voters are not allowed to
change their preference revelations during the execution of the protocol.
• scoring protocols. Let ~α = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉 be a vector of integers such that α1 ≥ α2 . . . ≥ αm. For
each voter, a candidate receives α1 points if it is ranked first by the voter, α2 if it is ranked second
etc. The score s~α of a candidate is the total number of points the candidate receives. The Borda
protocol is the scoring protocol with ~α = 〈m − 1,m− 2, . . . , 0〉. The plurality protocol (aka. majority
rule) is the scoring protocol with ~α = 〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉. The veto protocol is the scoring protocol with
~α = 〈1, 1, . . . , 1, 0〉.
• maximin (aka. Simpson). For any two distinct candidates i and j, let N(i, j) be the number of
voters who prefer i to j. The maximin score of i is s(i) = minj 6=iN(i, j).
• Copeland. For any two distinct candidates i and j, let C(i, j) = +1 if N(i, j) > N(j, i) (in this
case we say that i beats j in their pairwise election), C(i, j) = 0 if N(i, j) = N(j, i) and C(i, j) = −1
if N(i, j) < N(j, i). The Copeland score of candidate i is s(i) =
∑
j 6=i C(i, j).
• single transferable vote (STV). The protocol proceeds through a series of m− 1 rounds. At each
round, the candidate with the lowest plurality score (i.e., the least number of voters ranking it first
among the remaining candidates) is eliminated. The winner is the last remaining candidate.
• plurality with run-off. In this protocol, a first round eliminates all candidates except the two with
the highest plurality scores. Then votes are transferred to these (as in the STV protocol). After that,
a second round determines the winner among these two.
• cup (sequential binary comparisons). The cup is defined by a balanced binary tree T with one leaf
per candidate, and an assignment of candidates to leaves (each leaf gets one candidate). Each non-leaf
node is assigned the winner of the pairwise election of the node’s children; the candidate assigned to the
root wins. The regular cup protocol assumes that the assignment of candidates to leaves is known by
the voters before they vote. In the randomized cup protocol [4], the assignment of candidates to leaves
is chosen uniformly at random after the voters have voted. Note that the randomized cup protocol
differs from all the other protocols under discussion in the sense that all the others are deterministic.
In some settings, the voters are weighted. A weight function is a mapping w : V → N∗. When voters
are weighted, the above protocols are applied by simply considering a voter of weight k to be k different
voters. Different possible interpretations can be given to weights. They may represent the decision
power of a given agent in a voting setting where not all agents are considered equal. The weight may
correspond to the size of the community that the voter represents (such as the size of the state). Or,
1Some of the voting protocols require tie-breaking rules (at different stages of the execution of the protocol). These
rules are usually left undefined. The results in this paper do not depend on tie-breaking rules.
when agents vote in partisan groups (e.g., in parliament), the weights may correspond to the size of the
group (each group acts as one voter).
3 Manipulating an election
In this section we define our computational problem precisely. We lead into the definition by discussing
the different dimensions of the election manipulation problem:
1) What information do the manipulators have about the nonmanipulators’ votes? In the incomplete
information setting, the manipulators are uncertain about the nonmanipulators’ votes. This uncertainty
could be represented in a number of ways, for example, as a joint probability distribution over the non-
manipulators’ votes. In the complete information setting, the manipulators know the nonmanipulators’
votes exactly. We prove our results for the complete information case for the following reasons: 1a. It is
a special case of any uncertainty model. Therefore, our hardness results directly imply hardness for the
incomplete information setting. 1b. Via prior results of Conitzer and Sandholm [4], hardness results
for manipulation by coalitions in the complete information setting also imply hardness of manipulation
by individuals in the incomplete information setting. (We will discuss these implications in more detail
in the conclusions section of this paper.) 2. Results in the complete information setting measure only
the inherent complexity of manipulation rather than any potential complexity introduced by the model
of uncertainty.
2) Who is manipulating: an individual voter or a coalition of voters? Both of these are important
variants, but we focus on coalitional manipulation for the following reasons: 1. In elections with
many voters it is very unlikely that an individual voter can affect the outcome—even with unlimited
computational power. 2. For any constant number of candidates (even with an unbounded number
of voters), manipulation by individuals in the complete information setting is computationally easy
because the manipulator can enumerate and evaluate all its possible votes (rankings of candidates)
in polynomial time [4].2 (Manipulation by individuals in the complete information setting can be
hard for some voting protocols if one allows the number of voters and the number of candidates to
be unbounded [2, 1]). 3. Via prior results [4], hardness results for manipulation by coalitions in the
complete information setting also imply hardness of manipulation by individuals in the incomplete
information setting. (We will discuss these implications in more detail in the conclusions section of this
paper.)
3) Are the voters weighted or unweighted? Both of these are important variants, but we focus on
weighted voters for the following reasons: 1. In the unweighted case, for any constant number of
candidates (even with an unbounded number of voters), manipulation by a coalition in the complete
information setting is computationally easy because the coalition can enumerate and evaluate all its
2This assumes that the voting protocol is easy to execute—as most protocols are (including the ones under study).
However, there exist voting protocols that are NP-hard to execute [3].
effectively different vote vectors [4]. (The number of effectively different vote vectors is polynomial
due to the interchangeability of the different equiweighted voters.) 2. Via prior results [4], hardness
results for manipulation by weighted coalitions in the complete information setting also imply hardness of
evaluating the probabilities of different outcomes in the incomplete information setting with unweighted
(but correlated) voters. (We will discuss these implications in more detail in the conclusions section of
this paper.)
4) What is the goal of manipulation? We study two alternative goals: trying to make a given
candidate win (we call this constructive manipulation), and trying to make a given candidate not win
(we call this destructive manipulation). Besides these goals being elegantly crisp, there are fundamental
theoretical reasons to focus on these goals:
First, hardness results for these goals imply hardness of manipulation under any game-theoretic
notion of manipulation, because our manipulation goals are always special cases. (This holds both for
deterministic and randomized voting protocols.) At one extreme, consider the setting where there is
one candidate that would give utility 1 to each of the manipulators, and all other candidates would give
utility 0 to each of the manipulators. In this case the only sensible game-theoretic goal for the manipu-
lators is to make the preferred candidate win. This is exactly our notion of constructive manipulation.
At the other extreme, consider the setting where there is one candidate that would give utility 0 to
each of the manipulators, and all other candidates would give utility 1 to each of the manipulators. In
this case the only sensible game-theoretic goal for the manipulators is to make the hated candidate not
win. This is exactly our notion of destructive manipulation.
Second, at least for deterministic voting protocols in the complete information setting, the easiness
results transfer from constructive manipulation to any game-theoretic definitions of manipulation that
would come down to determining whether the manipulators can make some candidate from a subset of
candidates win. For example, one can consider a manipulation successful if it causes some candidate to
win that is preferred by each one of the manipulators to the candidate who would win if the manipulators
voted truthfully. As another example, one can consider a manipulation successful if it causes some
candidate to win that gives a higher sum of utilities to the manipulators than the candidate who would
win if the manipulators voted truthfully. (This definition is especially pertinent if the manipulators can
use side payments or some other form of restitution to divide the gains among themselves.) Now, we
can solve the problem of determining whether some candidate in a given subset can be made to win
simply by determining, for each candidate in the subset in turn, whether that candidate can win. So
the complexity exceeds that of constructive manipulation by at most a factor equal to the number of
candidates (i.e., a constant).
Third, the complexity of destructive manipulation is directly related to the complexity of deter-
mining whether enough votes have been elicited to determine the outcome of the election. Specifically,
enough votes have been elicited if there is no way to make the conjectured winner not win by casting
the yet unknown votes [5].
In summary, we focus on coalitional weighted manipulation (cw-manipulation), in the complete
information setting. We study both constructive and destructive manipulation. Formally:
Definition 1 CONSTRUCTIVE COALITIONALWEIGHTED (CW)-MANIPULATION. We are given
a set of weighted votes S (the nonmanipulators’ votes), the weights for a set of votes T which are still
open (the manipulators’ votes), and a preferred candidate p. For deterministic protocols, we are asked
whether there is a way to cast the votes in T so that p wins the election. For randomized protocols, we
are additionally given a distribution over instantiations of the voting protocol, and a number r, where
0 ≤ r ≤ 1. We are asked whether there is a way to cast the votes in T so that p wins with probability
greater than r.
Definition 2 DESTRUCTIVE COALITIONALWEIGHTED (CW)-MANIPULATION. We are given
a set of weighted votes S (the nonmanipulators’ votes), the weights for a set of votes T which are still
open (the manipulators’ votes), and a hated candidate h. For deterministic protocols, we are asked
whether there is a way to cast the votes in T so that h does not win the election. For randomized
protocols, we are additionally given a distribution over instantiations of the voting protocol, and a
number r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. We are asked whether there is a way to cast the votes in T so that h wins
with probability less than r.
4 Complexity of manipulation
Now, how many candidates are needed to make an election computationally hard to manipulate? The
answer depends on the voting protocol, and whether we are interested in constructive or destructive
manipulation. For example, the plurality protocol is easy to manipulate constructively and destructively
for any number of candidates [4]. The Borda protocol becomes hard to manipulate constructively with
3 candidates already, but is easy to manipulate destructively for any number of candidates [4].
The complexity of manipulation with a finite number of candidates has been studied by Conitzer and
Sandholm [4] for many of the voting protocols discussed in this paper. However, their focus was on the
question of whether or not a protocol is hard to manipulate for some finite number of candidates. For
many of the protocols, they did not determine the exact number of candidates at which the polynomial
to NP-complete transition occurs. This number is important for evaluating the relative manipulability
of different voting protocols (the lower this number, the less manipulable the protocol). In this paper,
we determine the exact number of candidates where this transition occurs. We also determine this
number for two protocols not addressed by Conitzer and Sandholm: veto and plurality with runoff.
When there are only two candidates, all the protocols are equivalent to the plurality protocol,
and hence both types of manipulation (constructive and destructive) are in P for all of the protocols.
The following theorem summarizes the results of Conizer and Sandholm [4] about the complexity of
manipulation as the number of candidates exceeds two:
Theorem 1 [4]
• For the Borda and STV protocols, constructive cw-manipulation is NP-complete for ≥ 3
candidates;
• For the Copeland and maximin protocols, constructive cw-manipulation is NP-complete for
≥ 4 candidates;
• For the regular cup and plurality protocols, constructive cw-manipulation and destructive
cw-manipulation are in P regardless of the number of candidates;
• For the randomized cup protocol, constructive cw-manipulation is NP-complete for ≥ 7
candidates;
• For the Borda, Copeland and maximin protocols, destructive cw-manipulation is in P re-
gardless of the number of candidates;
• For the STV protocol, destructive cw-manipulation is NP-complete for ≥ 4 candidates.
In the next subsection, we present our new results on the complexity of constructive manipulation.
In the subsection after that, we lay out our new results on the complexity of destructive manipulation.
4.1 New results on the complexity of constructive manipulation
We present our hardness results first, followed by our easiness results.
4.1.1 Hardness results
In this section we show hardness results for the two voting protocols for which no hardness results
were known before. In many of the proofs of NP-hardness, we use a reduction from the PARTITION
problem, which is NP-complete [11]:
Definition 3 PARTITION. We are given a set of integers {ki}1≤i≤t (possibly with multiplicities) sum-
ming to 2K, and are asked whether a subset of these integers sums to K.
Now we are ready to show our hardness results about manipulating elections.
Theorem 2 For the veto protocol, constructive cw-manipulation is NP-complete for 3 candidates
and more.
Proof. Showing the problem is in NP is easy. To show it is NP-hard, we reduce an arbitrary PARTITION
instance to the following constructive cw-manipulation instance. The 3 candidates are a, b and p. In S
there are 2K − 1 voters voting (a, b, p) (vetoing p). In T , for every ki there is a vote of weight 2ki. We
show the instances are equivalent.
If a partition of the ki exists, let the votes in T corresponding to one half of the partition vote
(p, a, b) (vetoing b), and let the other ones vote (p, b, a) (vetoing a). Then p has 4K points (it is vetoed
by 2K − 1 of the vote weight), whereas a and b each have only 4K − 1 points (they are each vetoed by
2K of the vote weight). So there exists a manipulation.
On the other hand, if a manipulation exists, let A be the set of ki corresponding to votes in the
manipulation vetoing a, and let B be the set of ki corresponding to votes in the manipulation vetoing b.
Because p is vetoed by at least 2K − 1 of the vote weight, and none of the votes in S veto a, it follows
that at least 2K − 1 of the vote weight in T vetoes a, that is,
∑
ki∈A
2ki ≥ 2K − 1, or
∑
ki∈A
ki ≥ K −
1
2
.
Because the ki are integers, it follows that
∑
ki∈A
ki ≥ K. Similarly,
∑
ki∈B
ki ≥ K. Since A and B are
disjoint, it follows that
∑
ki∈A
ki =
∑
ki∈B
ki = K. So there exists a partition. 
Theorem 3 For the plurality with runoff protocol, constructive cw-manipulation is NP-complete
for 3 candidates and more.
Proof. Showing the problem is in NP is easy. To show it is NP-hard, we observe that with 3 candidates,
plurality wit runoff coincides with STV, and constructive manipulation for STV with 3 candidates
is NP-hard , as we summarized in Theorem 1. 
4.1.2 Easiness results
We now solve several questions that were left unanswered in [4]. As was shown, cw-constructive
manipulation for the Copeland and maximin protocols is NP-complete for 4 candidates and more, and
in P for 2 candidates. But what about the case of 3 candidates? This problem is even more intriguing
for the randomized cup: cw-constructive manipulation is NP-complete for 7 candidates and more,
and in P for 2 candidates. But what if the number of candidates is in the 3–6 range? In this section
we address these three questions in order.
In each case, we prove easiness by demonstrating that if there is a successful manipulation, there
also exists one where all the manipulators vote the same way. Because the number of candidates is
constant, the number of different orderings of the candidates is constant. Therefore all such ways of
voting can be easily enumerated (and each way of voting is easy to evaluate in these protocols).
Theorem 4 If the Copeland protocol with 3 candidates has a constructive cw-manipulation, then
it has a constructive cw-manipulation where all of the manipulators vote identically. Therefore,
constructive cw-manipulation is in P.
Proof. Let the 3 candidates be p, a, and b. We are given the nonmanipulators’ votes S, and the weights
for the manipulators’ votes T . Let the total vote weight in T be K.
For a set of weighted votes V and two candidates x, y, we denote by NV (x, y) the cumulated weights
of the votes in V ranking x prior to y, and we let DV (x, y) = NV (x, y)−NV (y, x). Let us consider the
following four cases which cover all possible situations:
Case 1: K > DS(a, p) and K > DS(b, p).
In this case, any configuration of votes for T such that p is ranked first for all votes makes p win
the election.
Case 2: K > DS(a, p) and K = DS(b, p).
It can easily be shown that it is harmless to assume that all votes in T rank p first. Therefore, what
remains to be done in order to have p win is to find who in T should vote (p, a, b) and who should vote
(p, b, a). What we know so far (before knowing how the votes in T will split between these two profiles)
is: (1) DS∪T (p, a) = K − DS(p, a) > 0 and (2) DS∪T (p, b) = K − DS(p, b) = 0. (1) makes p get +1
and a get −1 while (2) makes both p and b get 0. Therefore, the partial Copeland scores (not taking
account of the a vs. b pairwise election), are +1 for p (which will not change after taking account of
the a− b pairwise election), −1 for a and 0 for b; hence, the only way for p to win (with certainty) is
to avoid b getting a point in the pairwise election against a, i.e., to ensure that DS∪T (a, b) ≥ 0. It can
easily be shown that this is possible if and only if K ≥ DS(b, a). Therefore, we have found that there
exists a successful manipulation for p iff K ≥ DS(b, a), and in this case a successful manipulation is the
one where all voters in the coalition vote (p, a, b).
Case 3: K = DS(a, p) and K > DS(b, p).
This is similar to Case 2, switching the roles of a and b; the condition then is K ≥ DS(a, b) and the
successful manipulation is the one where all vote (p, b, a).
Case 4: K < DS(a, p) or K < DS(b, p) or (K ≤ DS(a, p) and K ≤ DS(b, p)).
Here, whatever the votes in T , the Copeland score of p is smaller than or equal to 0 and therefore
p cannot be guaranteed to win, so there is no successful manipulation. Thus, in every case, either
there is no successful manipulation, or there is a successful manipulation where all manipulators vote
identically. 
Theorem 5 If the maximin protocol with 3 candidates has a constructive cw-manipulation, then
it has a constructive cw-manipulation where all of the manipulators vote identically. Therefore,
constructive cw-manipulation is in P.
Proof. Let the 3 candidates be p, a, and b. We are given the nonmanipulators’ votes S, and the weights
for the manipulators’ votes T . Let the total vote weight in T be K. Again, it is easy to show that all
the manipulators can rank p first without harm.
Let us denote by PK1,K2 a vote configuration for T such that a subset T1 of T , whose cumulated
weight is K1, votes (p, a, b) and T2 = T \T1, whose cumulated weight is K2 (with K1+K2 = K), votes
(p, b, a). Now all that remains to show is the following: if p wins with the votes in T being PK1,K2
then either p wins with the votes in T being PK,0 or p wins with the votes in T being P0,K . Let us
consider these two cases for the outcome of the whole election (including the votes in T ):
Case 1: the uniquely worst pairwise election for a is against b, and the uniquely worst pairwise election
for b is against a. One of a and b must have got at least half the vote weight in the pairwise election
against the other (say, WLOG, a) and therefore have a maximin score of at least half the vote weight.
Since a did even better against p, p received less than half the vote weight in their pairwise election
and therefore p does not win.
Case 2: One of a and b (say, WLOG, a) does at least as badly against p as against the other (so, a’s
worst opponent is p). Then all the voters in the coalition might as well vote (p, a, b), because this will
change neither a’s score nor p’s score, and might decrease (but not increase) b’s score. 
Theorem 6 If the randomized cup protocol with 6 candidates has a constructive cw-manipulation,
then it has a constructive cw-manipulation where all of the manipulators vote identically. (This
holds regardless of which balanced tree is chosen.) Therefore, constructive cw-manipulation is in
P.
Proof. Omitted for reasons of space constraint. 
4.2 New results on the complexity of destructive manipulation
In this section we present our new results on the complexity of destructive manipulation. We first lay
out the hardness results, and then the easiness results.
4.2.1 Hardness results
Among the protocols whose complexity has been studied with respect to destructive manipulation, the
only unanswered question is the complexity of destructive cw-manipulation of the STV protocol
with 3 candidates. We now determine that complexity.
Theorem 7 For the STV protocol with 3 candidates, destructive cw-manipulation is NP-complete.
Proof. Showing the problem is in NP is easy. To show it is NP-hard, we reduce an arbitrary PARTITION
instance to the following destructive cw-manipulation instance. The 3 candidates are a, b and h.
In S there are 6K voters voting (a, h, b), 6K voters voting (b, h, a), and 8K − 1 voters voting (h, a, b).
In T , for every ki there is a vote of weight 2ki. We show the instances are equivalent.
We first observe that h will not win if and only if it gets eliminated in the first round: for if it
survives the first round, either a or b gets eliminated in the first round. Hence either all the votes in
S that ranked a at the top or all those that ranked b at the top will transfer to h, leaving h with at
least 14K− 1 votes in the final round out of a total of 24K− 1, so that h is guaranteed to win the final
round.
Now, if a partition of the ki exists, let the votes in T corresponding to one half of the partition vote
(a, b, h), and let the other ones vote (b, a, h). Then in the first round, a and b each have 8K votes, and
h only has 8K − 1 votes, so that h gets eliminated. So there exists a manipulation.
On the other hand, if a manipulation exists, we know by the above that with this manipulation, h
is eliminated in the first round. Hence at least 2K − 1 of the vote weight in T ranks a at the top, and
at least 2K − 1 of the vote weight in T ranks b at the top. Let A be the set of all the ki corresponding
to votes in T ranking a at the top; then
∑
ki∈A
ki ≥ K −
1
2
, and since the ki are integers this implies
∑ki∈A
ki ≥ K. If we let B be the set of all the ki corresponding to votes in T ranking b at the top, then
similarly,
∑
ki∈B
ki ≥ K. Since A and B are disjoint, it follows that
∑
ki∈A
ki =
∑
ki∈B
ki = K. So there
exists a partition. 
This result also allows us to establish the hardness of destructive manipulation in the plurality with
runoff protocol:
Theorem 8 For the plurality with runoff protocol with 3 candidates, destructive cw-manipulation
is NP-complete .
Proof. Showing the problem is in NP is easy. To show it is NP-hard, we observe that with 3 candidates,
plurality wit runoff coincides with STV, and destructive manipulation for STV with 3 candidates
is NP-hard , as we proved in Theorem 7. 
4.2.2 Easiness result
While plurality with runoff is hard to manipulate destructively, the other protocol that was not studied
before turns out to be easy to manipulate destructively:
Theorem 9 For the veto protocol, destructive cw-manipulation is in Pfor any number of candi-
dates.
Proof. Conitzer and Sandholm showed that for protocols in which each candidate gets a numerical
score (and the candidate with the highest score wins), and which are monotonic, destructive cw-
manipulation is in P for any number of candidates. [4] (A score-based protocol is monotonic if ranking
a candidate higher never decreases that candidate’s score.) It is immediate from our definition of the
veto protocol that it is a monotonic score-based protocol. 
5 Conclusions and future research
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central
issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that
all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting
protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents,
it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Most earlier research on this
topic assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded [2, 1]. Such hardness results lose
relevance when the number of candidates is small, because manipulation algorithms that are exponential
only in the number of candidates might be available. The complexity of manipulating realistic elections
where the number of candidates is a small constant was recently studied [4], but the emphasis was on
the question of whether or not a protocol becomes hard to manipulate for some constant number of
candidates. That work, in many cases, left open the question: How many candidates are needed to make
elections hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when comparing the relative manipulability of
different voting protocols.
In this paper we answered that question for the voting protocols of the earlier study. We also
answered the question for two voting protocols for which no results on the complexity of manipulation
had been derived before: veto and plurality with runoff.
The following tables summarize the complexity of constructive and destructive manipulation, re-
spectively, as the state of knowledge stands after this paper. The nontrivial new results of this paper
are marked by an asterisk (∗).
Number of candidates 2 3 4,5,6 ≥ 7
Borda P NP-c NP-c NP-c
veto P NP-c∗ NP-c∗ NP-c∗
STV P NP-c NP-c NP-c
plurality with runoff P NP-c∗ NP-c∗ NP-c∗
Copeland P P∗ NP-c NP-c
maximin P P∗ NP-c NP-c
randomized cup P P∗ P∗ NP-c
regular cup P P P P
plurality P P P P
Complexity of constructive cw-manipulation
Number of candidates 2 ≥ 3
STV P NP-c∗
plurality with runoff P NP-c∗
randomized cup P ?
Borda P P
veto P P∗
Copeland P P
maximin P P
regular cup P P
plurality P P
Complexity of destructive cw-manipulation
As in the earlier paper, we studied manipulation by coalitions where the voters are weighted. In
this paper we clearly justified why that is a key setting to study, and also layed out the key reasons why
our definitions of manipulation are central. Our hardness results also imply hardness for manipulation
by individuals when the manipulator is uncertain about the nonmanipulators’ votes.3
Future research includes determining the complexity of destructively manipulating the randomized
cup protocol with 3 or more candidates, and designing new voting protocols that are hard to manipulate
according to our measure. Finally, NP-hardness is a worst-case measure, and it would be desirable to
prove that some of the voting protocols are hard to manipulate on average, or to design entirely new
voting protocols that are.
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